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 (i) 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether a bankruptcy court may approve a con-
tested settlement agreement that distributes assets 
in violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory prior-
ity rules and that departs from long-held absolute 
priority principles underlying the American bank-
ruptcy system. 
 
 (iii) 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici, whose names and affiliations are set forth 
in alphabetical order on Appendix A, are law profes-
sors who study the United States’ bankruptcy sys-
tem.  They write solely based on their concern about 
the effect that the opinion below will have on this 
system.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The opinion below threatens the foundation of 
the bankruptcy system—its priority structure.  Con-
gress created a detailed and deliberate order in 
which creditors should be paid.  On the facts of this 
case, the Bankruptcy Code’s priority structure enti-
tled the Petitioners to an estimated $8.3 million dol-
lars for a claim concerning unpaid wages.  Instead, a 
divided panel of the Third Circuit approved a settle-
ment agreement and dismissal order (known collec-
tively as a “structured dismissal”)2 that expressly 
disregarded the Petitioners’ priority entitlement and, 
despite properly lodged objections, awarded them 
nothing.  By distributing the debtor’s estate to junior 
creditors rather than paying wage claims with un-
contested priority, the Third Circuit’s opinion flouted 
the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules and longstand-
                                            
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief in 
blanket letters on file with the Clerk.  No counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no persons or enti-
ties other than amici and their counsel made a monetary con-
tribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
2 See generally Christopher W. Frost, Structured Dismis-
sals:  Smooth Off-Ramp or Artful Dodge?, 35 Bankr. L. Letter 
10 (2015) (describing structured dismissals). 
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ing norms.  Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code—not a 
liquidation under Chapter 7 or a reorganization plan 
under Chapter 11—permits this kind of priority-
skipping settlement in the absence of creditor con-
sent. 
The Third Circuit’s majority held that deviating 
from the Bankruptcy Code's priority rules was justi-
fied because “rare” cases require this sort of “flexibil-
ity.”  Pet. App. 2a, 12a & 18a.  There is, however, no 
workable standard for determining what makes this 
case “rare,” and, as Judge Scirica’s dissenting opin-
ion observed, there is correspondingly little guidance 
on what should trigger deviations in future cases—or 
how far such deviations may go.   
By creating an end run around the Bankruptcy 
Code’s explicit priority rules, the Third Circuit’s ap-
proach fosters perverse incentives: powerful parties 
will increasingly seek to resolve corporate bankrupt-
cy cases through structured dismissals which lack 
creditor safeguards that Congress built into the 
bankruptcy process.  The decision below will increase 
the costs of resolving Chapter 11 cases without any 
corresponding benefits, while also undermining core 
fairness goals in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy system. 
I. CASE HISTORY  
Jevic Transportation, Inc. (“Jevic,” or the “Debt-
or”) was a New Jersey trucking company.  Pet. App. 
2a.3  A subsidiary of Respondent Sun Capital Part-
                                            
3 Appendix citations refer to the appendices in the Peti-
tioners’ certiorari petition (“Petition”) or in the joint appendix 
(JA) filed by the parties at the merits stage. 
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ners,4 a private equity firm, acquired Jevic in a lev-
eraged buyout (LBO) in 2006.5  Id.  After the LBO, 
Jevic refinanced its debt with CIT Group (“CIT”), 
which lent Jevic $85 million in revolving credit se-
cured by Jevic’s assets.  JA22.  
A. The Bankruptcy And Settlement Agree-
ment  
Jevic could not service this debt.  It filed a Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy on May 20, 2008, one day after 
terminating 90% of its employees, including Peti-
tioners, Jevic’s truck drivers (the “Drivers”).  JA161.6  
                                            
4 This brief refers to Sun Capital Partners and its affiliated 
entities as “Sun.”  
5 In a leveraged buyout, a purchaser such as Sun will ac-
quire the stock of a target company, such as the Debtor.   
The acquirer finances the acquisition by borrowing a 
significant portion of the purchase price, liability 
which it causes [Debtor (D)] to assume after closing, 
secured by D’s assets. The (borrowed) purchase price 
is then remitted to D’s pre-acquisition shareholders. 
This has the effect of giving D’s selling shareholders 
the benefit of using D’s assets to gain priority over D’s 
pre-bankruptcy unsecured creditors, who will be jun-
ior in right to LBO lenders with liens encumbering D’s 
assets. 
Jonathan C. Lipson & Jennifer Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: 
The Article I Judicial Power, Fraudulent Transfers, and Lever-
aged Buyouts, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 1161, 1220.  
6 See also Joint Motion of the Debtors, CIT, Sun Capital 
and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 349 and 1112(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
9019 for Entry of an Order: (I) Approving Settlement Agreement 
and Releasing Claims; (II) Dismissing the Debtors’ Cases Upon 
Implementation of Settlement; and (III) Granting Related Relief 
at 2, ¶ 1 (“Settlement Motion”). 
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Petitioners hold an estimated $8.3 million in priority 
wage claims against Jevic for violating New Jersey’s 
version of the federal Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification (“WARN”) Act, which requires 
notification before mass layoffs.  See CAJA1087–99 
(complaint), CAJA1137–38 (class certification); 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:21-1 to -7.  
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
(“Committee”) was given permission to sue Sun and 
CIT on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, alleging that 
the LBO transfers were avoidable fraudulent and 
preferential transfers (the “Adversary Proceeding”).7  
Pet. App. 3a.  Sun and CIT moved to dismiss the Ad-
versary Proceeding.  The Bankruptcy Court denied 
the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Commit-
tee adequately pleaded such claims.  JA36–47.  If the 
Adversary Proceeding succeeded, the estate could 
avoid liens and potentially recover more than $100 
million from Sun and CIT.  JA54–56. 
Jevic borrowed more from CIT during its case on 
a “super-priority,” secured basis.  Settlement Motion 
3–4, ¶ 8.  This left Jevic “administratively insolvent,” 
meaning that its operating expenses in bankruptcy 
exceeded the value of its unencumbered assets.  Pet. 
5–6, 10. 
                                            
7 Leveraged buyouts may be avoided as fraudulent trans-
fers if the transfers (e.g., lenders’ liens or payments to selling 
shareholders) were made for less than reasonably equivalent 
value while the debtor was insolvent.  If the debtor was (or was 
rendered) insolvent and “receives nothing but debt in the LBO, 
it is not difficult to establish that it received inadequate value,” 
thus establishing a prima facie case to avoid the LBO transfers.  
Lipson & Vandermeuse, supra n.5, at 1220.  
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All major parties—except the Drivers—entered 
into an agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) set-
tling the claims in the Adversary Proceeding.  Pet. 
App. 4a.  The Settlement Agreement had two main 
elements relevant to this dispute: 
• First, Sun and CIT would pay about $3.7 mil-
lion to satisfy certain administrative expens-
es, such as fees of the Committee’s counsel, 
with the remainder going to general unse-
cured creditors—failing to pay the priority 
claims of the Drivers.  Pet. 11. 
• Second, Sun and CIT would be released from 
any liability associated with the LBO, includ-
ing the fraudulent transfer claims asserted in 
the Adversary Proceeding.8 
The Drivers objected.  On December 4, 2012, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an order, over the Drivers’ 
objection, approving the Settlement Agreement (the 
                                            
8 Specifically, the Settlement Agreement releases CIT and 
Sun from—  
any and all claims or counterclaims, causes of action, 
remedies, damages, liabilities, debts, suits, demands, 
actions, costs, expenses, fees, controversies, set-offs, 
third party actions or proceedings relating in any way 
to, or arising from any transaction with or in connec-
tion to, the Debtors or their estates of whatever kind or 
nature . . . including, without limitation, any and all 
claims asserted in or which could have been asserted 
in, or which related to the subject matter of the Adver-
sary Proceeding, or which are based on any avoidance 
or other powers afforded the Estate Releasing Parties 
under the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”    
Settlement Agreement ¶ 2(c)(i), (ii), at 4–6 (emphasis supplied) 
(exhibit A to the Settlement Motion). 
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“Dismissal Order” and, together with the Settlement 
Agreement, the “Structured Dismissal”).  Pet. App. 
45a.  The Bankruptcy Judge’s reasoning included a 
factual finding that the estate was administratively 
insolvent and thus could not remain in bankruptcy.  
But the Dismissal Order also included the legal con-
clusion that the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules did 
not apply to a settlement, as distinct from a Chapter 
11 plan or Chapter 7 liquidation.  Id. 58a.   
The Bankruptcy Judge rejected the suggestion 
that the case should be converted to a Chapter 7 liq-
uidation, where the priority rules would undoubtedly 
apply, because the lenders made clear that they 
would refuse to reach the same settlement if the case 
were converted, and “it does not appear that a Chap-
ter 7 Trustee would have any money to operate, in-
vestigate or litigate.”  Id.  Yet, the fraudulent trans-
fer claims asserted in the Adversary Proceeding were 
at least strong enough to survive motions to dismiss.  
See In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 08-11006 BLS, 
2011 WL 4345204, at *10–12 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 
15, 2011); see also Pet. 10.  As noted above, if the Ad-
versary Proceeding succeeded, the estate could po-
tentially recover more than $100 million.   
B. The Appeal  
The Drivers appealed.  The District Court and a 
divided Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court.  
The majority below concurred with the reasoning 
of the Bankruptcy Judge that the Bankruptcy Code’s 
priority rules did not apply to the distribution of es-
tate assets under a settlement agreement.  Pet. App. 
17a.  In “rare instances,” the majority reasoned, a 
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court may skip priority claims when distributing es-
tate assets if the bankruptcy court has “specific and 
credible grounds to justify [the] deviation.”  Id. 12a, 
21a (alteration in original; internal quotations omit-
ted).  The majority found such grounds here, endors-
ing the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that the set-
tlement and structured dismissal were the “least bad 
alternative.”  Id. 21a-22a. 
Judge Scirica dissented.  In his view, “the bank-
ruptcy court’s order undermined the [Bankruptcy] 
Code’s essential priority scheme” by “skip[ping] over 
an entire class of creditors” in distributing estate 
property.  Id. 23a, 29a-30a.  While he left open the 
possibility that in “extraordinary circumstances” the 
Bankruptcy Code might permit a settlement that de-
viates from the priority scheme, he found that the 
Structured Dismissal here was “an impermissible 
end run around the carefully designed routes by 
which a debtor may emerge from Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings.”  Id. 24a, 27a-28a.  Judge Scirica also 
warned that, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the 
circumstances here were not “sui generis” and that it 
is “not difficult to imagine another secured creditor 
who wants to avoid providing funds to priority unse-
cured creditors.”  Id. 31a. 
The Petition followed. 
II. THE CHAPTER 11 SYSTEM  
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the princi-
pal legal mechanism for restructuring troubled busi-
ness organizations.  Commencing a Chapter 11 case 
has three simultaneous legal consequences:   
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• First, an “estate” is created, comprised of all 
property of the debtor.  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  
The estate includes hard assets as well as in-
tangible assets, such as causes of action. 
• Second, a fiduciary manages the debtor’s es-
tate.  Chapter 11 presumes that the debtor’s 
management team will serve this role as the 
“debtor in possession” (DIP) unless the court 
orders otherwise. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1104.  
As fiduciaries, the DIP has a duty to act in 
the best interest of the bankruptcy estate.  11 
U.S.C. § 1107(a).  The DIP may operate the 
debtor in the ordinary course.  11 U.S.C. 
§§ 363(b)(1), 1108.  
• Third, a stay of collection actions goes into ef-
fect.  11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  This “automatic 
stay” is meant to create an opportunity for 
the DIP and creditors to determine the best 
way to maximize the value of the debtor, in-
cluding restructuring or sale.   
Bargaining and negotiation are central features 
of Chapter 11.  “‘[T]he Chapter 11 process,’” this 
Court has explained, “‘relies on creditors and equity 
holders to engage in negotiations toward resolution 
of their interests.  Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. 
Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457 
n.28 (1999) (quoting Eric G. Brunstad, Jr., Mike 
Sigal, & William H. Schorling, Review of the Pro-
posals of the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies: Part One, 
53 Bus. Law. 1381, 1406 n.136 (1998)).  A Chapter 11 
case is often characterized as “an invitation to a ne-
gotiation” between the debtor and its stakeholders.  
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See In re Arnold, 471 B.R. 578, 592 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2012) (quoting Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 397 
(6th ed. 2009)).  These negotiations are meant to 
channel participants toward a “plan of reorganiza-
tion,” a complex instrument that “represents a kind 
of consent decree which has many attributes of a 
contract.”  See In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 
365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981).  
Although reorganization of the debtor was tradi-
tionally the goal of Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Code 
expressly contemplates that the plan process can be 
used to effectuate a sale of assets, whether as a going 
concern or piecemeal.  11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5).  Plans 
can be used even when (as in Jevic) a debtor has 
gone out of business, because they provide a fair and 
efficient means for liquidating and distributing the 
value of the debtor’s estate.  See, e.g., Hunter Savings 
Assocs. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 74 B.R. 65, 67 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (characterizing liquidating 
plans as an “effective reorganization.”).  
Plans can have a wide range of effects.  Among 
other things, they will generally pay creditors a por-
tion of their claims and discharge—eliminate legal 
liability for—the balance.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5) & 
1141(d).  
The Bankruptcy Code contains procedural and 
substantive protections that must be met to confirm 
a plan, four of which stand out in this case: 
• First, the plan must have been presented to 
creditors in a “disclosure statement” which 
contains “adequate information” about the 
plan and the debtor sufficient to enable credi-
10 
 
 
tors to vote for or against it. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(b).9  When cases are resolved via 
structured dismissal, as in Jevic, creditors 
receive no disclosure statement.  
• Second, the plan must have a minimum level 
of stakeholder support, generally speaking 
the vote of 2/3 in dollar amount and more 
than half in number of creditors.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1126(c).  Having this requisite level of cred-
itor support is an essential precondition to 
binding holdouts and objectors to a plan.  In 
Jevic, creditors had no vote.  
• Third, the plan must pay each creditor no 
less than such creditor would receive in a 
Chapter 7 liquidation.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).  In a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, the trustee would have had to pay the 
Drivers in full before paying lower priority 
creditors.  This is because a Chapter 7 distri-
bution must strictly follow the priority rules 
in section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Sec-
tion 507(a)(4) provides that unpaid wage 
claims, such as the Drivers’, must be paid 
fourth in order of priority from assets of the 
debtor’s estate.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).  Thus, 
section 507 bars final distributions to junior 
claimants unless priority creditors either are 
paid in full in cash or agree otherwise.  11 
                                            
9 “Adequate information” is defined as “information of a 
kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable 
in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the condi-
tion of the debtor’s books and records . . . that would enable [] a 
hypothetical investor of the relevant class to make an informed 
judgment about the plan.”  11 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
11 
 
 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B).  The Drivers received 
nothing on account of their priority claims, 
and did not agree otherwise, while general 
unsecured creditors received about $1.7 mil-
lion from Jevic’s estate.    
• Fourth, a dissenting class of creditors cannot 
be bound by a Chapter 11 plan unless the 
court makes additional findings about their 
treatment.  Specifically, to approve a plan 
over the objections of a dissenting class, the 
court must find, among other things, that the 
plan is “fair and equitable.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(b).  “Fair and equitable” is a term of 
art which implements the so-called “absolute 
priority rule” (APR).  “[T]he absolute priority 
rule . . . require[s] that ‘the creditors . . . be 
paid before the stockholders could retain [eq-
uity interests] for any purpose whatever.’”  
LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 444 (internal citations 
omitted).  The absolute priority rule is the 
“cornerstone of reorganization practice and 
theory.”  See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auc-
tions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 69, 123 
(1991).  Here, there was no plan and no such 
analysis to protect the Drivers. 
If plan negotiations fail, or the debtor’s reorgani-
zation otherwise appears hopeless, the case may be 
converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code or dismissed.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(b)(1).  In the event of conversion to Chapter 7, 
the debtor’s assets will be liquidated by a trustee.  If 
the case is dismissed, the Bankruptcy Code generally 
contemplates that the debtor and its stakeholders 
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are to be returned to the pre-bankruptcy status quo.  
11 U.S.C. § 349(b). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OPINION BELOW ERRS BECAUSE IT SUB-
VERTS CONGRESS’ POWER TO ESTABLISH BANK-
RUPTCY’S PAYMENT PRIORITY STRUCTURE 
The majority opinion below concludes that, at 
least in some instances, a settlement agreement and 
dismissal order need not comply with the rules just 
reviewed.  That conclusion conflicts with the Bank-
ruptcy Code and longstanding, core bankruptcy prin-
ciples.  
A. Congress, Not Courts, Determines Pay-
ment Priorities To Advance Bankruptcy 
Policy 
As  noted, above, bankruptcy uses two sets of 
priority rules: (i) those created by Congress, in § 507 
of the Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) the “absolute priori-
ty rule” used, among other things, to assess plans (11 
U.S.C. § 1129(b)) and settlements.10  Those rules ap-
ply in the only two ways that final distributions may 
be made in a bankruptcy case: (i) a confirmed Chap-
ter 11 plan, or (ii) a Chapter 7 liquidation.11  Unless 
a party with a priority entitlement agrees otherwise, 
there is simply no basis for deviating from the Bank-
                                            
10 As discussed below, the absolute priority rule applies to 
settlements as a matter of common law, not statute.  See Protec-
tive Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 432 (1968). 
11 11 U.S.C. § 726. 
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ruptcy Code’s priority structure when making final 
distributions.12 
The statutory priority rules set out in section 
507—including the uncontested priority of the Driv-
ers’ claims in Jevic—reflect explicit legislative judg-
ments.  “Code-authorized priorities among unsecured 
claims are rooted both in the exigencies of bankrupt-
cy, and in other public policy considerations.”  Melis-
sa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: 
Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bank-
ruptcy, 123 Yale L.J. 862, 906 (2014).  These political 
judgments made by Congress, in turn, reflect demo-
cratic decision-making about the resolution of finan-
cial distress.  Priority treatment for claims of rank-
and-file workers—the very category of claim that the 
Structured Dismissal in Jevic intentionally exclud-
ed—is a key example of Congress deliberately pro-
tecting a class of claimants that otherwise might 
have little leverage in a Chapter 11 case.  
This Court recently—and unanimously—
reminded us of the importance of honoring Congress’ 
judgments of this sort even if, under the facts of 
some cases, the outcome is perceived as undesirable 
or inconvenient.  In the context of property exemp-
tions for individual debtors, this Court observed that: 
“The Code’s meticulous—not to say mind-numbingly 
                                            
12 We focus here on final distributions of estate property. 
Courts and scholars debate the circumstances under which the 
bankruptcy estate can make interim distributions to creditors 
in the absence of statutory authority, if doing so maximizes the 
bankruptcy estate overall.  See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 
F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2004).  That issue need not be resolved 
to determine that the distribution of assets in Jevic was im-
permissible.  
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detailed—enumeration of exemptions and exceptions 
to those exemptions confirms that courts are not au-
thorized to create additional exceptions.”  Law v. 
Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (2014).   
“To give priority to a claimant not clearly entitled 
thereto,” this Court said in Howard Delivery Ser-
vices, “is not only inconsistent with the policy of 
equality of distribution; it dilutes the value of the 
priority for those creditors Congress intended to pre-
fer.”  Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. 
Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667 (2006) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted).  By giving the Drivers’ priority 
entitlement to junior unsecured creditors instead, 
that is what the Settlement Agreement did.  Yet, it is 
not the province of courts to displace Congressional-
ly-established priorities, as happened in this case.   
Neither Respondents (to date) nor the lower 
court majority have cited any published or un-
published decisions in which priority was altered in a 
final distribution of estate property over the objec-
tion of a priority creditor, and we are aware of 
none.13  This may be because the Bankruptcy Code’s 
priority structure is clear, and courts recognize that 
                                            
13 Indeed, structured dismissal cases on which the majority 
rely, such as Buffet Partners, were careful to point out the ab-
sence of objections to the dismissal there.  See In re Buffet Part-
ners, L.P., No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 3735804, at *3 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014) (approving structured dismis-
sal where “[t]here are no non-consenting creditors [and] . . . 
[t]he proposed structured dismissal appears fair and equita-
ble.”), cited in Pet. App. 15a; see also In re Naartjie Custom 
Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 426 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015) (approving 
structured dismissal because, among other things, “no economic 
stakeholder has objected”).  
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they are not at liberty to subvert Congress’ policy 
judgments in this regard. 
Respondents and the lower court appear to rec-
ognize that the Structured Dismissal here advances 
no bankruptcy policy.  Indeed, as Judge Scirica noted 
in dissent, “it is difficult to see how the settlement is 
directed at estate-value maximization.  The settle-
ment deviates from the [Bankruptcy] Code’s priority 
scheme so as to maximize the recovery that certain 
creditors receive.”  Pet. App. 26a (Scirica, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).  Instead, the Re-
spondents and lower court have posited more gener-
ally that “‘settlements are favored in bankruptcy.’”  
Resp. Opp. 19.14   
This truism cannot solve the problem with Jevic.  
This Court has previously condemned the prospect of 
two parties stripping the rights of a third party un-
der the guise of a settlement.  “[P]arties who choose 
to resolve litigation through settlement,” this Court 
has stated, “may not dispose of the claims of a third 
party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or obliga-
tions on a third party, without that party's agree-
ment.”  Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-
CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 
                                            
14 Bankruptcy settlements in the Third Circuit are gov-
erned by the four-part test articulated in In re Martin.  91 F.3d 
389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996) (Courts should assess “(1) the probabil-
ity of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; 
(3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, 
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the 
paramount interest of the creditors.”).  As the Third Circuit has 
noted elsewhere, the purpose of the Martin test is “to maximize 
the recovery of those to whom the company has obligations.”  In 
re RFE Indus., Inc., 283 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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(1986).  That, however, is exactly the effect of Jevic’s 
Structured Dismissal: it takes the Drivers’ entitle-
ment to recoveries on their undisputed priority 
claim—which the Drivers estimate to be over $8 mil-
lion—and distributes it, instead, to junior unsecured 
creditors.  
It is no answer to say that Respondents would 
not settle on other terms, and thus the Drivers’ stat-
utory priority rights must be ignored.15  As Judge 
Scirica correctly observed in his dissent, it was 
“[c]ritical to th[e] analysis . . . that the money paid by 
the secured creditors in the settlement was property 
of the estate.”  Pet. App. 28a.  (Scirica, J. dissenting 
in part and concurring in part).  While Respondents 
could have walked away, they would have faced the 
risk of continued litigation over the failed LBO.  
Having chosen to purchase peace, instead, they had 
no power to direct the distribution of proceeds re-
ceived by the estate in derogation of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority rules.  
                                            
15 Sun’s expressed reason for refusing to settle with the 
Drivers is especially ironic.  Its counsel argued that payment to 
the Drivers would have amounted to funding an adversary’s 
litigation.  Pet. App. 24a (“As Sun’s counsel explained at the 
settlement hearing, ‘if the money goes to the WARN plaintiffs, 
then you’re funding someone who is suing you who otherwise 
doesn’t have funds and is doing it on a contingent fee basis.’”) 
(Scirica, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part).  Yet, even 
without being paid on account of their priority claim, the Driv-
ers pursued the WARN Act litigation against Sun—which was 
not settled in the Settlement Agreement—and Sun won.  See In 
re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 14-4331, 2016 WL 4011149, at *1 
(3d Cir. July 27, 2016). 
17 
 
 
B. Settlements In Bankruptcy Are Subject 
To The “Absolute Priority Rule” 
Respondents have argued that “[t]here is not a 
single reported decision from any circuit holding that 
any provision of the Bankruptcy Code extends the 
absolute priority rule to settlements.”  Resp. Opp. 12.  
Respondents are wrong.   
Respondents and the majority below rely heavily 
on the Second Circuit’s decision in In re Iridium Op-
erating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463–64 (2d Cir. 2007).  
Pet. App. 19a (“We agree with the Second Circuit’s 
approach in Iridium.”); Resp. Opp. 2 (citing Iridium, 
478 F.3d at 455).  The reliance is misplaced. 
In Iridium, the unsecured creditors’ committee 
sought to settle a suit it had brought against a group 
of secured lenders that would have divided the es-
tate’s cash between the lenders and a litigation trust 
created to sue Motorola, a priority administrative 
creditor (and the debtor’s corporate parent).  478 
F.3d at 456, 459–60.  Motorola objected to the set-
tlement, arguing that the distribution violated the 
absolute priority rule by skipping its first-priority 
claim.  Id. at 456. 
The Second Circuit looked to this Court’s opinion 
in TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson, which “held that 
‘[t]he requirements . . . that plans of reorganization 
be both ‘fair and equitable’ apply to compromises just 
as to other aspects of reorganizations.’”  See Iridium, 
478 F.3d at 463 (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. 
Stockholders, 390 U.S. at 424).   
Consistent with TMT Trailer Ferry, the Second 
Circuit did not approve the priority-skipping distri-
bution sought in Iridium.  Rather, it remanded with 
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the observation that whether a settlement “complies 
with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme will be 
the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to 
consider in approving a settlement.”  See Iridium, 
478 F.3d at 455 (emphasis supplied).  
Iridium provides no support for the Structured 
Dismissal here, for two reasons.  First, the majority 
below strayed far from the language of Iridium.  Re-
specting the priority claims of the Drivers was hardly 
the “most important factor” in approving the Struc-
tured Dismissal.  
Second, no court in Iridium ultimately blessed a 
priority-skipping settlement.  Rather, on remand, it 
appears that Motorola, the debtors, and other credi-
tors continued to negotiate.  Their disputes were re-
solved in a “Global Settlement” under which priority-
creditor Motorola apparently released its adminis-
trative expense claims and consented to distributions 
to (junior) unsecured creditors.  See Order Approving 
a Global Settlement of Disputes Between and/or 
Among the Debtors, The Statutory Creditors’ Com-
mittee, the Debtors’ Prepetition Secured Lenders and 
Motorola, Inc. (Dkt. No. 1540), In re Iridium Operat-
ing LLC, No. 99-45005 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 
20, 2008).  Thus, it appears no priority-skipping dis-
tribution was made over the objection of a non-
consenting priority creditor. 
What ultimately happened in Iridium is what 
should have happened in Jevic.  Rather than approve 
the Structured Dismissal over the Drivers’ objection, 
the court below should have sent it back to the 
Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings.  Con-
sistent with the bargaining dynamic that is central 
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to bankruptcy, it is likely (although not guaranteed) 
that the parties here would have negotiated to revise 
the Settlement Agreement which, if acceptable to all 
parties, would have resolved their disputes, and 
paved the way for a resolution of this case consistent 
with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority system.  
Unfortunately, the Jevic majority failed to appre-
ciate the bargaining dynamic at work in Iridium.  
While bankruptcy, like other fields of law, seeks to 
promote settlement, the desire to settle is not license 
to violate the law over the objection of a party 
harmed by the violation.   
Here, the Structured Dismissal released Sun and 
CIT from liability—inside bankruptcy and out—for 
the failed leveraged buyout that led to the company’s 
bankruptcy.  It therefore not only skipped the Driv-
ers’ priority claim; it also foreclosed their only re-
maining source of recovery.  But for Jevic’s bank-
ruptcy, the Drivers would have been able to assert in 
state court fraudulent transfer claims similar to 
those in the Adversary Proceeding, because every 
state has a law permitting avoidance of fraudulent 
transfers.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 25:2-20 (2015) 
(New Jersey’s version of Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act).  Absent the releases, the dismissal of the 
bankruptcy would have revested those claims with 
non-settling creditors, here the Drivers.16 
                                            
16 Section 349 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the effect of 
dismissals.  It provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]nless the 
court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case . . . (3) 
revests the property of the estate in the entity in which such 
property was vested immediately before the commencement of 
the case under this title.”  11 U.S.C. § 349(b).  This means that 
dismissal should “undo the bankruptcy case, as far as practica-
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II. SUBVERTING BANKRUPTCY’S PRIORITY STRUC-
TURE WILL CREATE COSTLY UNCERTAINTY 
The opinion below creates uncertainty about the 
conditions that would permit its deviations, and how 
far such deviations may go.  This uncertainty impos-
es steep costs.  
A. Jevic’s Triggers And Scope Are Uncertain 
The Jevic majority justified deviating from the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority and dismissal rules due 
to the “dire circumstances” of the case.  Pet. App. 8a.  
Thus, the Third Circuit majority concluded that pri-
ority-skipping settlements may be approved “in a ra-
re case,” if the bankruptcy court has “‘specific and 
credible grounds to justify [the] deviation.’”  Id. 21a 
(quoting Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466) (alteration in orig-
inal).  Unfortunately, as Judge Scirica observed, the 
majority opinion offers no guidance on what makes 
this case “rare.”17 
                                                                                         
ble.”  H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 338 (1977).  In this case, the 
Structured Dismissal and Settlement Agreement released Sun 
and CIT from “third party actions or proceedings relating in any 
way to, or arising from any transaction with or in connection to, 
the Debtors or their estates of whatever kind or nature . . . in-
cluding, without limitation, any and all claims asserted in or 
which could have been asserted in, or which related to the sub-
ject matter of the Adversary Proceeding . . . .”  Settlement 
Agreement ¶ 2(c)(i), (ii), at 4–6 (emphasis supplied).  In so do-
ing, the Jevic majority significantly expanded the “cause” ex-
ception in § 349.  Cf. In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 
1991) (reversing lower courts’ approval of a dismissal order that 
stripped a secured creditor of its collateral). 
17 “I depart from the majority opinion,” he explained “in 
holding this appeal presents an extraordinary case where de-
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1. Jevic’s Trigger Is Unclear Because 
This Case is Not Rare 
The key factor appears to have been the estate’s 
administrative insolvency.  See JA180; Pet. App. 58a.  
Administrative insolvency means that a debtor is 
unable to pay the ongoing expenses of operating in 
bankruptcy.  That may be grounds to convert or dis-
miss a case.  See, e.g., In re Acme Cake Co., 495 B.R. 
212, 217 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010).  Administrative in-
solvency does not, however, make a case “rare.”  See 
American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to 
Study the Reform of Chapter 11, 2012-2014 Final 
Report and Recommendations 173 (2014) (noting that 
“‘administratively insolvent’ cases have become more 
common”).  Nor does it justify deviation from the 
Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules.   
Conditioning priority rule deviations on the 
debtor’s financial condition arguably creates perverse 
incentives to impair a debtor’s solvency, further un-
dercutting Congress’ authority in creating the priori-
ty structure.  Indeed, Jevic would seem to reward 
those who contribute to administrative insolvency 
through pre- and post-bankruptcy lending transac-
tions while they also seek to dictate the terms of a 
final distribution that defies the bankruptcy priority 
rules.  
At bottom, this case was a garden-variety failed 
leveraged buyout (LBO).  Failed-LBO bankruptcies 
are hardly rare.18  They often result in fraudulent 
                                                                                         
parture from the general rule is warranted.”  Pet. App. 24a 
(Scirica, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
18 The recent bankruptcies of Caesar’s Entertainment and 
Energy Future Holdings Corp., for example, were precipitated 
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transfer suits, as happened here.  See, e.g., Boyer v. 
Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 F.3d 787 (7th 
Cir. 2009); In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 503 B.R. 348 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent 
Conveyance Litigation, 499 B.R. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
see also Martin D. Ginsburg, Jack S. Levin & Donald 
E. Rocap, Mergers, Acquisitions and Buyouts ¶ 1706 
(Wolters Kluwer, Sept. 2015) (collecting 
LBO/fraudulent transfer cases).  
Neither the Third Circuit majority opinion nor 
the underlying facts reveal what makes Jevic rare.  
Because its facts are not rare, the decision is simply 
not clear as to what should trigger similar deviations 
in the future.  This uncertainty “would seem to invite 
further litigation to test [Jevic’s] boundaries.”  See 
Jonathan C. Lipson & Stephen Walsh, In re Jevic 
Holding Corp., 3, ABA Business Bankr. Committee 
Newsl. (American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill.), 
May 21, 2015, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/
committees/CL160000pub/newsletter/201507/fa_3.pdf.  
This state of affairs may be attractive to repeat play-
ers in Chapter 11 cases who would prefer a distribu-
tion of estate assets other than the one the Bank-
ruptcy Code requires.  
                                                                                         
by failed leveraged buyouts.  See Jim Christie, Caesars Invites 
Bankruptcy Examiner to Probe Leveraged Buyout, Reuters, July 
2, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/bankruptcy-caesars-
idUSL1N0ZI0FB20150702#EQIcL2jYOSClJILY.97; Matt Lev-
ine, Largest Leveraged Buyout Ever Is Finally Bankrupt, 
Bloombergview, Apr. 29. 2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2014-04-29/largest-leveraged-buyout-ever-is-finally-bank
rupt (discussing Energy Future Holdings). 
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2. Jevic’s Limits Are Unclear 
As Jevic’s trigger is uncertain, so too is its stop-
ping point.  If a settlement can skip the Drivers’ 
statutory priority, other equally foundational priority 
rules and standards may be up for grabs, too.   
Consider, for example, the classic application of 
the absolute priority rule, to prevent the “squeeze 
out” of unsecured creditors in a reorganization 
plan.19  Absolute priority developed in response to 
railroad reorganizations in which senior creditors 
and junior shareholders were sometimes said to col-
lude in an effort to retain control of a distressed 
debtor, skipping over intermediate creditors. Ste-
phen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern 
Bankruptcy Theory, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1420, 1445 
(2004) (calling this dynamic “[o]ne of the most con-
troversial features of receiverships”).   
Absolute priority became “the familiar rule that 
the stockholder's interest in the [debtor’s] property is 
subordinate to the rights of creditors . . . first, of se-
cured, and then of unsecured, creditors.”  See Louis-
ville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 
U.S. 674, 684 (1899).  “‘Any arrangement of the par-
ties by which the subordinate rights and interests of 
the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the 
expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors 
comes within judicial denunciation,’” this Court has 
said.  See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 505 
(1913) (quoting Louisville Trust, 174 U.S. at 684).  If 
Jevic permits the squeeze-out of the Drivers in a set-
                                            
19 The Bankruptcy Code’s current use of the absolute prior-
ity rule in connection with Chapter 11 plans is discussed above.  
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tlement and dismissal order, it is not clear why a set-
tlement and dismissal order could not also eliminate 
the rights of general unsecured creditors using a sim-
ilar rationale.  
Likewise, Jevic raises questions about statutes 
that confer priority outside of the bankruptcy sys-
tem.  Under a federal statute designed to protect 
government claims, for example, “a claim of the 
United States Government shall be paid first when a 
person indebted to the Government is insolvent” and, 
intentionally or not, the debtor’s assets are placed 
beyond the reach of the federal government.20  If fed-
eral courts can deprive the Drivers of the express 
priority entitlement of their wage claims, as in Jevic, 
beneficiaries of other priority statutes, such as the 
United States, can no longer be sure that they are 
immune from a similar fate. 
B. Jevic’s Costs 
The uncertainty created by Jevic imposes at least 
three types of costs.  First, Jevic will promote rent 
seeking: “Contestable priority rules make creditors’ 
returns more variable and harder to predict.  The 
greater variance of their returns may cause creditors 
                                            
20 The statute provides in full: “(a) (1) A claim of the United 
States Government shall be paid first when (A) a person in-
debted to the Government is insolvent and (i) the debtor with-
out enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary as-
signment of property; (ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is 
attached; or (iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or (B) the 
estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or 
administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor.”  31 
U.S.C. § 3713.  It does not apply to a debtor in a bankruptcy 
case under title 11.  Id. 
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to raise their prices or forgo what would otherwise be 
value-increasing transactions.”  Mark J. Roe & Fred-
erick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How 
Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 Va. 
L. Rev. 1235, 1273 (2013).  
To be sure, commercial lenders who can “adjust” 
to these new conditions can respond by contracting 
the supply of credit or raising its price.  A common 
critique of uncertain legal rules, and of nonconsen-
sual deviations from rules that were previously 
thought to be certain, is that they increase the costs 
of credit.  Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., As-
sessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 
727 (2010).  But the Drivers, the objecting creditors 
in Jevic, are generally recognized to be “non-
adjusting” creditors.  “Non-adjusting” creditors “do 
not choose to extend credit to the corporation, and so 
cannot through pricing or other market mechanisms 
adjust their rights against the debtor, even if the 
debtor fully encumbers its assets.”  Jonathan C. Lip-
son, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance 
and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 
UCLA L. Rev. 1189, 1240 (2003).  “[E]mployees,” for 
example, “are typically not as able as large institu-
tional creditors to diversify their credit portfolio so as 
to minimize the impact of their employer filing bank-
ruptcy.”  See Daniel Keating, The Fruits of Labor, 35 
Ariz. L. Rev. 905, 907 (1993).  If a structured dismis-
sal can strip them of the priority Congress gave their 
claims, they will lose whatever bargaining leverage 
the Bankruptcy Code gave them. 
Put another way, “if the jumped creditors adjust 
more slowly than the nimble jumping creditors, val-
ue transfers occur and such jumps make for winners 
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and losers.”  Roe & Tung, 99 Va. L. Rev. at 1241–42.  
The winners and losers may conflict directly with the 
priority system created by Congress that has long 
been central to a reasonably efficient bargaining en-
vironment in Chapter 11. 
Second, Jevic will make it more difficult to re-
solve Chapter 11 cases through negotiation.  Bank-
ruptcy negotiations are most effective when they 
begin “inside a priority framework.”  Roe & Tung, 99 
Va. L. Rev. at 1271.  Here, the lower courts teach 
that foundational rules on priority can be ignored in 
“rare” cases that turn out on inspection not to be ter-
ribly rare.  By creating an underspecified exception 
to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules, Jevic creates 
the possibility—or the threat of the possibility—of 
priority-evading settlements in a wide range of situa-
tions.  This will increase incidents of dispute and the 
costs of negotiated resolution because, if the majority 
opinion below stands, parties simply have less cer-
tainty about their priorities relative to one another. 
A third cost is to the federal judiciary.  It does 
the bankruptcy courts no favors for an appellate 
court to hold that subversions of clear statutory pri-
ority rules are permitted when the judge deems a 
case to be “rare.”  Past practice suggests that parties 
and professionals will regularly test the boundaries 
of Jevic’s priority deviation, and seek the same or 
analogous treatment in their own cases.21  Jacoby & 
                                            
21 The website of one prominent law firm, for example, 
promotes structured dismissals “as a way to minimize costs and 
maximize creditor recoveries.”  See Taking a Stand Where Few 
Have Trodden: Structured Dismissal Held Clearly Authorized 
by the Bankruptcy Code, Jones Day, Sept./Oct. 2014, http://www.
jonesday.com/taking-a-stand-where-few-have-trodden-structured-
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Janger, 123 Yale L.J. at 887–89.  In other words, 
supposedly exceptional cases may become the norm.  
As parties seek these deviations more frequently, 
bankruptcy judges will, in turn, increasingly be 
asked to ignore the rule of law.   
The Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules are a shield 
protecting bankruptcy judges from having to decide 
“take-it-or-leave-it” settlements like the one that con-
fronted the Bankruptcy Court here.  The challenges 
associated with sorting amongst these deals can be 
especially acute in business bankruptcies with fewer 
resources, less market information, and relatively 
modest public scrutiny overall.  While the Bankrupt-
cy Code relies on judicial discretion with respect to 
many important decisions, Congress wisely gave 
judges neither the power—nor the burden—to sort 
between priority-subverting settlements in the man-
ner Jevic would require. 
  
                                                                                         
dismissal-held-clearly-authorized-by-the-bankruptcy-code-10-01-
2014/. 
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CONCLUSION 
The settlement agreement and dismissal order in 
Jevic stripped the Drivers of payment and collection 
rights they are promised by the Bankruptcy Code.  
This treatment defied the clear language of the 
Bankruptcy Code, subverting Congress’ power to de-
termine the priority of final distributions of a debt-
or’s estate in bankruptcy.  The Third Circuit majori-
ty, while declaring the case to be “rare,” articulated 
no limiting principles, creating a significant risk that 
the opinion will distort the resolution of financial 
distress in the future.  This Court should reverse the 
majority opinion below. 
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